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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relevance of the European integration experience for 
East Asia's future security architecture.  Or, put differently, the study asks what the European 
experience can tell us about future East Asian security institutions.  Tracing European cooperative 
efforts from the early post-World War II days to recent attempts of stabilizing the neighborhood 
via a European Neighborhood Policy, the paper argues that the process of European security 
integration provides useful lessons that can inform a similar process in East Asia.  
Given that there are significant differences between post-1945 Europe and 21st century 
East Asia--including the U.S.'s promotion of regional institutions in Europe versus bilateral 
alliances in East Asia (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002); more or less equal power capabilities in 
Europe versus the huge power asymmetry with respect to China in Asia; a fairly homogeneous 
European culture versus a heterogeneous Asian culture; largely traditional security threats in Cold 
War Europe versus a whole range of non-traditional security threats in East Asia, etc.--the East 
Asians are unlikely to copy the exact same steps taken by the Europeans to improve their 
security, i.e., one model does not fit all.  Nor does the promotion of stability/peace-building have 
to be unidirectional--economic cooperation, for instance, does not necessarily have to precede 
security cooperation.   
Since history--due to Japan's troubled past with its neighbors, and the creation of two 
Koreas and two Chinas--is still a "neuralgic point in East Asia" (Berger, 2006: 3), it is argued that 
Japanese, Koreans and Chinese can be expected to develop a distinct path to stabilize the region.  
And yet, considering the multi-faceted nature of security threats, the main ingredient of the 
European success strategy, namely the institutionalization of trust on multiple levels, and hence 
the creation of a complex web of governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003), is likely to be emulated 
in the long run. 
Although many Taiwanese, as well as some Japanese and Koreans, would disagree, the 
paper assumes that the main enemy is strategic instability, and that institutional structures 
therefore are not created against anyone, but to reduce the high uncertainty East Asians confront 
regarding each others' actions and intensions.   Institutions are to provide fora to air opinions, 
establish rules (non-intervention in others' domestic affairs), access information, and reduce 
transaction costs.  Moreover, it is understood that institution-building on multiple levels (local, 
national, sub-regional, regional) and across issue areas (economy, environment, security, energy, 
etc.) takes time and various forms (bottom-up versus top-down). 
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  3While institutions are being created to enhance transparency, efficiency and trust, the 
paper argues, the East Asians need to address their historical legacies to promote security.  Japan, 
in particular, more effectively and credibly needs to deal with its war guilt, while Chinese and 
Koreans are receptive to apologies from Japan.  As Berger (2006) and Kaiser (2006) convincingly 
demonstrate in the German case, the dynamics of historical memory are quite complex.  Germany 
has spent decades trying to come to terms with its war guilt by engaging in reeducation efforts, 
begging forgiveness, providing monetary compensation, building museums, etc.  It is conceivable 
that this European experience may inform East Asia, i.e., that Japan may emulate the German 
model--rewrite its text books, extend heartfelt apologies to its neighbors (which some argue it has 
already done), stop its visits to the Yasukuni shrine, etc.  However, it is also plausible that Japan 
may prefer to take a different path and rely on different types of restitution.  In any event, it is 
hypothesized that, addressing this divisive issue, at a minimum, will help bring about greater 
cooperation, but may in fact be a necessary condition for the creation of a structurally 
sophisticated security arrangement.  
Here the literature on reconciliation is pertinent.  As Long and Brecke (2003: 124), for 
instance, make clear, "[e]motions and reason are not generally antagonistic; they are 
complementary. … Emotions recognize challenges and opportunities in our environment, and 
they identify our preferences."  This then suggests that governance structures may be determined 
by much more than cost/benefit analyses of rational actors, namely also actors' emotions.  Since 
Japan’s apologies thus far have appeared “ad hoc and made grudgingly under 
international/regional pressure” (Suzuki 2007: 9), it can be hypothesized that resurfacing history 
problems, and emotional needs stemming from them, may have to be taken care of before 
institutional structures requiring a significant degree of commitment can be built.  Or, put 
differently, the settlement of historical disputes may be a necessary prerequisite before further 
security cooperation can be achieved, but is unlikely to be sufficient.   
In sum, the paper argues for a two-pronged strategy to enhance East Asian security: (1) 
dealing with historical legacies and war guilt; and (2) building trust via institutions.  Since 
confidence-building, as the European case makes abundantly clear, does not happen over night, 
the goal is to remove outstanding obstacles to cooperation and create institutional structures that 
promote mutual respect, trust and tolerance.  Over time, and commensurate with their threat 
perception(s), East Asians may graduate to more sophisticated security arrangements to dilute, 
absorb and/or contain conflict and to reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behavior.  Thus, in the 
long run, East Asia may also end up with a complex web of governance and “thick alphabet soup 
of international agencies” (Ullman 1991: 145) to promote peace, but, due to the differences 
between post-1945 Europe and 21st century East Asia mentioned above, unique indigenous 
developments, and significant changes in the international environment since the Europeans 
began their institution-building, this web/soup is unlikely to be a carbon copy of the European 
one. 
 
Conceptual Frameworks on East Asian Security 
 
Examining East Asian security provisions from the perspective of a Europeanist, one is 
struck by the fact that there are much fewer theoretical writings on the subject.  What one mainly 
finds are assessments of the likelihood of stability in the region with prognoses ranging from 
severe pessimism to cautious optimism.   
(Neo)realists, as expected, focus on the security dilemma, the zero-sum international 
environment, power politics, and relative capabilities and, consequently, are pessimistic about the 
prospects of peace.  Due to the anarchic nature of international politics, a regional arms race 
(Glaser 1993: 6), great power conflict (Betts 1993/94: 9), strategic rivalries (Hwang 2006: 5), and 
nuclear proliferation (Friedberg 1993/94: 29) seem to be where China, Japan and the two Koreas 
are headed.  
  4Hegemonic stability theorists, similarly, predict a bleak future for the region.  A rising 
China, Roy (1994: 149-150) for instance argues, will be able to challenge Japan which in turn 
will feel threatened and remilitarize.  Or, in other words, dissatisfied with the status quo, China 
will become increasingly assertive (Jansen 2002: 763) and plunge the region into a hegemonic 
war (Roy 1994: 165).  Alternatively, Japan may revise its Peace Constitution, and once this 
“demarcation line is broken through,” there will be concern about a rising, remilitarized Japan 
(Garrett and Glaser 1997: 391).  In this scenario, China and, very likely, South Korea are 
expected to increase their capabilities to deal with this Japanese challenge.    
Neoliberals/institutionalists are more upbeat about the prospects of cooperation in East 
Asia.  Shambaugh (2004/05: 64), for example, points out that “most nations in the region now see 
China as a good neighbor,” rather than a threatening regional power.  Absent imminent threat, yet 
still concerned about “the lack of transparency in the intentions and strategic thinking of Beijing” 
(Lee 1997: 252), Funabashi (1993), McVadon (1999), Wu (2000), Acharya (2003), to name but a 
few scholars, suggest to engage China in a variety of institutions.  Similarly, Vaeyrynen (2001), 
Cha (2003), Katzenstein (2004), and many others, advocate incorporating Japan in a host of 
institutional arrangements ranging from bi- to multilateral.  Although not a “cure-all,” cooperative 
security arrangements, these scholars argue, are a step in the right direction in that they reduce 
uncertainty, lower transaction costs, and promote trust.  
In addition to regional stability assessments, with few exceptions (Acharya 2003; Buzan 
and Waever 2003; Suh et.al. 2004; Katzenstein 2005) one largely finds descriptive accounts of 
East Asian security arrangements where scholars compare countries’ GDP, military hardware, 
military strategies, etc., to calculate who is likely to win a war in which scenarios.
1     
 
Conceptual Frameworks on European Security 
 
  Aside from studies investigating security threats and the prospects for peace both during 
and since the end of the Cold War (Deutsch and Singer 1969; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1991; 
Grieco 1993; Kupchan 1994; Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995; Van Evera 1996), there is a 
sizeable literature on alternative modes of organizing cooperation among states that ranges from 
public goods discussions, strategic interaction and quid pro quo bargaining (Axelrod 1984; Oye 
1986; Stein 1990), to regime theory (Krasner, ed. 1983; Keohane 1984) and studies of global 
norm-creation, diffusion and internalization (Axelrod 1986; Kratochwil 1989; Nadelmann 1990; 
Klotz 1995; Katzenstein, ed. 1996; Cortell and Davis 1996).   
  Particularly useful in the context of European integration, however, has been the large 
literature on multi-level governance.  Spanning several disciplines,
2 this literature identifies a 
host of factors that are important to understand why the Europeans chose the types of cooperative 
arrangements they did.  Adopting a governance approach,
3 one, for instance, learns that 
governance does not always entail one-way control.  Two-way or multi-dimensional designs are 
found frequently and there is a vast literature on increasingly complex types of organization.  One 
common feature of these frameworks involves the relationship between vertical and horizontal 
loci of activity: “multilevels” and “networks.”  For example, according to Marks et al (1998: 
273), “EU policy is produced by a complex web of interconnected institutions at the 
supranational, national, and subnational levels of government comprising a system of ‘multi-level 
governance.’”  Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) also differentiate levels of jurisdiction spanning from 
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  5the local to the supranational level, while Scharpf (2001) distinguishes between 
intergovernmental, joint, and supranational decision-making.  Similarly, Gstoehl (1995: 13) 
speaks of “variable geometry,” Eising and Kohler-Koch (1999) of “overlapping policy networks,” 
Johannson-Nogués (2003) of “network governance,” Lavanex (2004) of “external governance,” 
and Emerson (2003: 4) of “hub-and-spoke, cobweb, matrix and Rubik cube arrangements.” 
Other scholars highlight factors such as the formality of rules and the inclusiveness or 
exclusiveness of the governance arrangements.  Abbott and Snidal (2000) conceptualize 
institutional arrangements in terms of degree of legalization, i.e., hard versus soft law, while 
Dunsire (1993) differentiates between regulation and self-regulation.  And more recently, Hooghe 
and Marks (2003: 236) proposed to differentiate two types of multi-level governance design: 
“Type I,” they explain, entails “general-purpose jurisdictions, non-intersecting memberships, 
jurisdictions at a limited number of levels, and a system-wide architecture.”  Type II  is 
characterized by “task-specific jurisdictions, intersecting memberships, no limit to the number of 
jurisdictional levels, and flexible design” (ibid). 
Clearly, a great variety of institutional structures can be found in the international 
environment and actors who have decided to cooperate to promote security - rather than to rely on 
self-help - have some degree of choice between different governance structures that entail varying 
degrees of institutionalization.
4 Assuming that actors pursue governance to solve collective action 
problems, one might propose a  classification scheme ranging from hierarchical to non-
hierarchical modes of governance.  Elsewhere (Weber 1997; 2000; and Weber and Hallerberg 
2001) a continuum of different institutional arrangements ranging from relationships 
characterized by high autonomy to more structured relationships with significantly restricted 
autonomy has been discussed in some detail.   
In the security realm, it has been shown, an (external) threat is instrumental in 
determining the nature and degree of a state’s initial commitment to an alliance (Walt 1988).  A 
related security motivation is the fear of exclusion from a cooperative security arrangement, even 
where a state faces no specific security threat.  In other words, there are both “push” and “pull” 
factors – fears of attacks and abandonment - that might encourage states to join cooperative 
security arrangements (Christensen and Snyder 1990).  If the level of threat is low and the actors 
are viable with respect to the competition they face, there is no need for a strong commitment, 
and, if the actors choose to cooperate, an informal rather than a structurally sophisticated 
arrangement might be chosen.  Such arrangements have low exit costs, usually do not require 
ratification by state actors, and can be easily modified or discarded (Lipson 1991).  On the other 
hand, if the level of threat is high, actors are likely to prefer an arrangement that gives them 
greater assurance (i.e. one that is more binding, thereby reducing the risk of defection).  These 
incentives for security cooperation might be measured in terms of relative military capability and 
geographic proximity.  Other factors such as uncertainty, high asset specificity, and a need for 
regular transactions may increase the desire of actors to institutionalize their commitments 
(Williamson 1979, Williamson 1985, and Weber 1997).  
In sum it has been argued that, both a high level of threat and high transaction costs are 
often necessary to bring about a structurally sophisticated institutional arrangement (they are 
separately necessary), but neither is sufficient.  One therefore should be sensitive to governance 
arrangements that arise because of other factors in addition to (or even instead of) calculations 
about power or threats, such as normative concerns, collective identity, socialization processes, or 
even symbols, language, and rhetoric.  This open-ended approach may allow one to shed light on 
cases where governance arrangements develop without a clear security threat or fail to emerge 
despite a clear threat. 
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2003: Chapter 1). 
  6  In the following, this study reexamines the governance literature scholars draw on so 
heavily in the European context and evaluates its explanatory power in the Asian case.  It, 
moreover, demonstrates that a better understanding of the complex security relations in East Asia 
is contingent on the "cross-fertilization" of multi-level governance approaches with ideational and 
psychological conceptual frameworks.  In doing so, it affirms the need for "eclectic theorizing" 
(Katzenstein and Sil 2004) to make sense of East Asian security affairs or, as Buzan and Waever 
(2003: 14) put it, the need to "mix" materialist and constructivist approaches. 
After addressing an important caveat, the paper investigates Europe's complex 
institutional history, where different cooperative arrangements with varying memberships coexist 
and work alongside each other.  Next, a mini case study of Japan will be conducted.  Specifically, 
the paper examines historical legacies that still stand in the way of closer cooperation and, 
comparing Japan’s attempts at reconciliation with those of Germany, aims to make a number of 
policy recommendations.  Then the paper scrutinizes presently existing security arrangements 
(bilateral relations between the US and Japan, US and China, US and South Korea, ASEAN 
Regional Forum, North-East Asia Cooperation Dialogue, etc.) and, assuming voluntary 
cooperation rather than coercion,
5 i.e., that the actors are free to choose the degree of 
institutionalization and commitment they desire, seeks to ascertain which European solutions to 
cooperation problems and which institutional structures, if any, may be copied or adapted.  Based 
on previous research of European institutional developments (both by the author and others), the 
study postulates that there will be package deals on a case-by-case basis and that, in the long run, 
East Asians will "embed" existing institutions into regional, sub-regional, and maybe even trans-
regional ones to avoid sole dependence on the "American hub and spokes network of bilateral 
alliances in Asia" (Cha 2003: 108).  It is also conceivable that the U.S. might play the role of 
guarantor in a multilateral non-aggression structure, at least in the short to medium term.   
 
Caveat: Asia is NOT Europe 
 
  As Friedberg (1993/94: 7) correctly emphasizes, “what is true of Europe may not be true 
for other parts of the world.”  In Europe, he insists, there are various factors (democratic 
governments; equality; dense web of institutions, etc.) that mitigate instability, whereas in Asia, 
“many of these same soothing forces are either absent or of dubious strength and permanence” 
(ibid).  France and Germany used to care about Alsace/Lorraine but, we are told (Friedberg 
1993/94: 16-18), have long since moved beyond these differences.  Not so in East Asia.  Rather 
than to “converg[e] on a single, shared interpretation of their recent past, the Asian powers show 
signs of divergence, each constructing a history that serves its own national purposes (ibid, p. 18).  
And, to make matters worse, there is the timing of institutionalization.  In Europe this process 
occurred soon after World War II and continues to this day, whereas the East Asians got a much 
later start (ibid. p. 22). 
  Kang (2003) could not agree more with Friedberg’s assessment.  “Because Europe was so 
important for so long a period, in seeking to understand international relations,” Kang (2003: 58) 
laments, “scholars have often simply deployed concepts, theories, and experiences derived from 
the European experience to project onto and explain Asia,” a practice he finds “problematic at 
best.”  “Eurocentric ideas,” in his mind seem to have obfuscated rather than aided our 
understanding of Asian alliance behavior in that they have “yielded several mistaken conclusions 
and predictions.” 
  And yet, there are parallels between Europe and Asia.  Case in point is the 
Franco/German versus the Sino/Japanese axis.  Just because China and Japan have not “begun to 
deal with their poisoned historical relations” (Kaiser 2006: 90), this does not imply that they 
could not learn from France and Germany’s behavior in the aftermath of World War II.  In fact, it 
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  7is nonsensical to assume that Asia would discount valuable insights to be gained from the 
European experience, begin from scratch when it comes to institution-building and, so to speak, 
“reinvent the wheel.” 
  As Kaiser (2006: 90) makes clear, European history does provide important lessons for 
Sino-Japanese relations, particularly when it comes to “dealing with the past and the question of 
guilt, nationalism, integration and political leadership.” He, for instance, explains that, although 
Japanese officials repeatedly have asked their neighbors for forgiveness for Japanese atrocities, 
these acts did not achieve the desired results, “because they were not fully internalized by 
Japanese society as a whole” (ibid, p. 91-2).  Kaiser then outlines a number of steps (issuance of 
formal apology, monetary compensation, preservation of memory, creation of trust, etc.) that 
were essential in bringing about reconciliation between Germany and its neighbors and, in his 
mind, are applicable to Sino-Japanese relations. These steps, along with other literatures on 
reconciliation, will be scrutinized in greater detail below, following a brief discussion of 
European institution-building. 
 
Europe’s Institutional History in a Nutshell
6  
 
  The defeat of Germany and Japan at the end of World War II left a tremendous vacuum 
to the west and east of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, France, and the United States 
were not at all sure how the USSR would react to this change. Would the Soviet Union cooperate 
with the United States and allow for free elections in Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe as 
indicated at Yalta, or would it pursue an expansionist policy and thereby pose a threat to the 
security of independent countries? 
  As history texts (Black et. al. 1992; Ray 1992; Keylor 1992; Kaplan 1999) make 
abundantly clear, due to the imposition of Soviet puppet governments in some of the East 
European countries, as well as the immense military imbalance between the Soviet Union and the 
western world, by 1946, the West Europeans already felt threatened by the Soviet Union and 
some, foremost among them France, additionally feared a resurgent Germany. To enhance their 
security these countries solicited U.S. support, promoted greater cooperation among themselves 
and, very importantly, sought to integrate Germany in international institutions to contain its 
power once and for all.  Thus, over the course of more than half a century, the West Europeans 
gave rise to numerous cooperative arrangements with varying memberships and varying degrees 
of structural commitment which, since the end of the Cold War, many East European countries 
joined.  Or, in other words, the Europeans, gradually, built a complex web of governance to 
enhance their security and promote stability and prosperity. 
   Perceiving a dual threat, the West Europeans had different security needs in the early 
post-1945 period than the U.S., which largely viewed the Soviet Union as posing a political threat 
to international peace.  This explains why the former acted first to improve their security.  In 
early 1947 British foreign minister Ernest Bevin took a decisive step to coordinate a West 
European defense system by offering a treaty to France.  In his mind such a treaty should not only 
win French support by promising British assistance in the event of renewed German aggression, 
but also decrease the uncertainty regarding French behavior by pulling France away from the 
USSR.  This two-fold objective required that the text of an Anglo-French alliance would be 
worded carefully so as not to antagonize the USSR any further (give it the impression that it 
could be directed against it) or seriously offend Germany (since the latter eventually might have 
to be included in a Western security system).  After drawn-out deliberations, on March 4, 1947, a 
                                                           
    
6 Over the course of many centuries Europe experienced periods of great upheaval as well as prolonged peace.  
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following section draws on Weber (2000) chapters 5 and 6.   
  8Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance was finally signed at Dunkirk, in the form of an old-
fashioned military alliance. 
  Only days after Dunkirk, the American position began to change.  U.S. decision-makers 
started to attribute recent unrest in Greece and Turkey to Soviet infiltration attempts and therefore 
persuaded President Truman to take action to stop Soviet influence from spreading.  On March 
12, 1947, the American president (in what became known as the Truman Doctrine) asked 
Congress for direct financial aid to support free peoples who are susceptible to pressure from the 
Soviets or pressure from domestic Communist movements.  And, as a further safeguard against 
Soviet infiltration, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, on June 5, 1947, introduced a plan 
(Marshall Plan) to aid European economic recovery via massive U.S. financial assistance.  
  Still viewing the Soviet threat as political in nature, however, the U.S. was determined to 
avoid “entangling alliances” and made clear to the West Europeans that they would have to 
demonstrate their willingness to engage in self-help before any further U.S. commitment would 
be discussed.  Again, Bevin took the lead and, on January 22, 1948, called for the creation of a 
Western union.  A series of worrisome incidents in early 1948 (the Communist takeover of the 
government in Prague; a telegram by General Clay from Berlin warning that war “could come 
with dramatic suddenness”; rumors about a Soviet-Norwegian nonaggression pact; talk that 
Denmark feared an armed invasion by the USSR) underlined the need for greater security 
cooperation and, on March 17, 1948, led to the signing of the Brussels Treaty in which the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries vowed to build a common defense system and to 
strengthen economic and cultural ties. 
  Since the Europeans now had fulfilled their end of the bargain, Truman gave permission 
to start secret North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) talks with the UK and Canada.  While the negotiating 
parties were discussing several versions of a pledge with varying degrees of commitment, the 
Soviets, feeling provoked by western occupation policies in Berlin, responded with a partial, and 
soon thereafter full, blockade of the city.  The United Kingdom initiated an airlift (which the U.S. 
later joined) and, on September 27, the defense ministers of the Brussels Treaty powers decided 
to create a Western Union Defense Organization as a first step to a larger association that the 
United States should join.  At the same time, NAT talks were progressing and, on April 4, 1949, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. signed the North Atlantic Treaty.  Within a year of its 
creation, NATO became much superior to traditional military coalitions and, through a high level 
of integration, a unified command, joint planning, and combined military training, set itself apart 
from most previous military arrangements. 
  Although, on May 9, 1949, the USSR lifted its blockade on Berlin, improved East-West 
relations did not follow.  On the contrary, on September 23, President Truman announced the 
detection of an atomic explosion in the Soviet Union and responded by signing a Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act to facilitate cooperation among the Western allies.  Then, on June 25, 1950, North 
Korea attacked South Korea.  Convinced that the Korean War was initiated by the USSR, and that 
it might even be a “dress-rehearsal” for Europe, the Western powers grew anxious about their 
serious military inferiority vis-à-vis the USSR and began to discuss German rearmament.   
  Terrified by the increase in Soviet belligerence and deeply troubled by the prospect of a 
remilitarized Germany, in the fall of 1950 France called for the founding of a European army in 
which the contingents of the members (including Germany) “would be incorporated…on the level 
of the smallest possible unit.”
7  That is, fearing that Germany could become militant again and 
act opportunistically, France sought to contain Germany through integration and control.  Initially 
opposed by other countries (the U.S., the UK, and the Benelux countries preferred to integrate 
Germany in NATO), the proposal for a European Army--also known as the European Defense 
Community (EDC)--was eventually accepted by them only to be rejected finally by the French 
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  9themselves.  Following Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, and the signing of the Korean armistice 
on July 23, 1953, many French perceived a reduction in Soviet threat and thus, on August 29, 
1954, the French National Assembly voted against the ratification of the EDC and made its 
demise official.  The result of four years of security debates was a strengthened NATO, i.e., 
agreement was reached that the Western European Union (WEU) would be restored within 
NATO, that Germany would join the WEU and hence, become a member of NATO. 
  At about the same time an EDC was being discussed, two Frenchmen, Jean Monnet (a 
businessman) and Robert Schuman (foreign minister), in consultation with West German 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, proposed to bring the coal and steel industries of France and 
Germany under one interstate organization with significant supranational characteristics.  Other 
countries were invited to join and on April 18, 1951, France, West-Germany, the Benelux 
countries, and Italy signed the Treaty of Paris, creating the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC).  Although bringing about a Free Trade Area for basic materials such as coal, coke, iron, 
ore and steel would yield economic benefits, the main purpose of the ECSC was to tackle the 
French-German problem and “make war between France and Germany ‘not merely unthinkable, 
but materially impossible’” (McCormick 1999: 66).  
By ratifying the ECSC Treaty in August 1952 each member state declared its willingness 
to curtail its sovereignty voluntarily by delegating some aspects of its autonomy to a “High 
Authority” and, thus, started a long process of institution-building that led to the creation of a 
sophisticated structural arrangement which, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, 
became known as the European Union (EU).  Without a doubt, the EU represents one of the most 
complex experiments in regional integration since the advent of the modern nation state in the 
17
th century and, over five decades, not only increased its competencies significantly, but also 
expanded its membership from six to 27 member states.  Since this process is well documented 
(Lewis 1993; Dinan 1994; McCormick 1999; Nugent 1999), it here suffices to draw attention to 
the main developments on the road toward greater integration.  
As has already been seen in the case of the European Army, integration efforts suffered 
setbacks but, each time, proponents of a united Europe “relaunched” the European idea 
(McCormick 1999: 68).  When the failure of the EDC, for instance, made clear that greater 
integration in the security realm could not be achieved at the time, the foreign ministers of the 
ECSC countries met at Messina in June 1955 to discuss further economic cooperation.  These 
negotiations culminated in the signing of the Treaties of Rome on March 25, 1957, in which the 
ECSC countries brought about a European Economic Community (EEC) and a European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom).  In the coming years the signatories of the EEC sought to bring 
about a Common Market and to harmonize their economic policies.  By 1973 they achieved a 
Customs Union, i.e., removed internal tariffs and set common external tariffs.  Since non-tariff 
barriers continued to exist, in April 1985, the Commission produced a White Paper identifying 
roughly 300 measures that would have to be taken to get rid off the remaining obstacles to trade.  
Moreover, a European Council meeting in December 1991 called for economic and monetary 
union, a common foreign and security policy, the abolition of frontier controls, and a common 
immigration policy.  As these Maastricht objectives (so called since they were signed by the 
member states at Maastricht on February 7, 1992), are being implemented (adoption of the Euro; 
creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force; signing of the Schengen Agreement, etc.), the EU 
is moving closer toward a “United States of Europe.”  
It is therefore fair to suggest that, since the signing of the Treaty of Paris that gave rise to 
the ECSC, the Europeans have come a long ways with their deepening process.  In a little more 
than 50 years they have moved from a free trade area to a customs union to a common market 
with a common currency, and have discussed the further curtailment of their freedom of action in 
the context of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, a European Security and Defense Policy, 
Europol, etc.  It furthermore needs to be stressed that integration took place at varying speeds 
 10where those EU member states that were ready to move forward did so, while allowing others to 
exempt themselves from policies that they were not yet ready to adopt.
8  
At the same time, through a host of accession treaties, the Europe of Six has now grown 
to an EU of 27.  Since membership is unlikely to be extended much further  (Turkey and some of 
the former Yugoslav Republics may join some time in the future) the EU is now also in the 
process of figuring out what institutional arrangements it should seek with its new neighbors—
countries like Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, but also Southern 
Mediterranean countries like Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine 
Authority, Syria, and Tunisia.
9
Finally, one needs to keep in mind that the EU does not operate in a vacuum.  In the 
security realm, ever since its founding in 1949, NATO has played an important role in stabilizing 
the European continent and continues to do so.  Like the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization has experienced its ups (new members; various partnerships) and downs (France 
pulling out of SHAPE in the 1960s; the failure of the Multilateral Force) and has come a long 
ways in institutionalizing both cooperation among its members and with its partners (PfP; EAPC; 
NATO-Russia Founding Act; NATO-Ukraine Charter; Mediterranean Dialogue, etc).  One 
further international organization that helps promote peace in Europe is the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE—formerly known as the CSCE) which, since the 
signing of the Helsinki Accord in 1973, has taken a particular interest in human rights issues.  
Then there is also the Council of Europe (where Heads of State exchange ideas), the United 
Nations (UN), and, until recently, when it became absorbed by the EU, there was the Western 
European Union (WEU).   Thus, what we see in Europe are multiple institutional arrangements 
with varying memberships alongside each other and varying degrees of structural commitment 
collectively comprising a complex web of governance to promote stability and prosperity.   
 
Mini Case Study: Japan 
 
Historical Legacies 
 
As Jansen (2002: 512) makes clear, “[t]hroughout history Japan’s stability had been related to 
that of China.”  The problem of China, specifically “China-centrism,” was of utmost importance.  
Since China viewed itself as “the cultural center of the universe and …all non-Chinese [as] 
‘uncivilized’ barbarians,” and insisted on the “preeminence of the Middle Kingdom and a 
tributary system of foreign relations” (Vohra 2000: 24), Japan-China relations for centuries were 
characterized by the threat of invasion and warfare.  
Particularly damaging for Asian relations was the Sino-Japanese war in 1895.  For China, 
according to Vohra (2000: 66), this war meant “[a] crippling defeat at the hands of the ‘dwarf’ 
Asian barbarians, who had historically been looked down on as vastly inferior to the [Chinese].”  
Not surprisingly, therefore, China a year later signed a secret defense treaty with Russia but, 
ultimately, could not prevent its territory from becoming divided into “spheres of influence” by 
foreign powers (Vohra 2000: 81). 
  The image of Japan by its neighbors suffered further and, as Jansen (2002: 515) argues, 
“lasting damage” as a result of Japan’s actions during World War I (which Japan was committed 
to join to make good on its alliance with the United Kingdom) and its aftermath.  Rather than to 
return bases it had seized from Germany to China at the end of the war, Japan elected to keep 
these holdings in its possession for a number of years.  And although the Kellogg-Briand Pact (of 
which Japan was one of the original 15 signatories), by “renounc[ing] war as an instrument of 
                                                           
    
8 See the UK and Denmark who exempted themselves from the Euro zone. 
    
9 For a closer look at the EU’s relations with its “New Neighborhood,” see Weber, Smith, and Baun, eds. 
(forthcoming). 
 11national policy,” may have given Japan’s neighbors some hope that the country may be turning 
over a new leaf, all hope was shattered in the early 1930s when Japan decided to conquer 
Manchuria to develop a resource base to prepare for war with the USSR (Jansen 2002: 527, 580).  
Fearing the Soviet Union and communism, in November 1936 Japan signed the Anti-Comintern 
Pact with Germany.  Shortly thereafter, Japan began to encroach on China’s northern provinces 
and, in July 1937, was at war with China that lasted until the US defeated Japan in 1945.  Korea, 
which had come under Japanese rule in 1894 when the Chinese lost their influence over Seoul, 
likewise, was not liberated until 1945. 
  What needs to be understood is that the atrocities committed by the Japanese against the 
Koreans (discussed elsewhere) and the Chinese, to this day, cause hatred and suspicion.   
Particularly gruesome—and thus still an issue in Sino-Japanese relations today--was the fall of 
Nanking (Nanjing) to Japanese armies in December 1937.  In what came to be known as the 
“Rape of Nanjing,” victorious troops committed unspeakable crimes “against a totally unarmed 
and helpless civilian population and disarmed prisoners-of-war.”…[A]t least “20,000 women 
were raped once or repeatedly…and many thousands of men, women and children, and POWs 
were ruthlessly butchered.”…”Within only six weeks after the fall of Nanjing the Japanese 
military apparatus ha[d] slaughtered more than 340,000 Chinese POWs and civilians” (Vohra 
2000: 164).   Prisoners were systematically mistreated and the disclosure by Korean and Chinese 
“comfort women” demanding restitution became a big problem for Japan in the 1990s (Jansen 
2002: 656) and continues to this day. 
  Contrary to what happened in Europe where shared history helped to promote 
reconciliation, the steps taken thus far by China and Japan (war crimes trials, postwar reparations, 
peace treaty) have been “flawed and incomplete” (Rose 2005, 11).  Hence the history problem 
resurfaces and, as Vohra (2000: 299) points out, in practically every top-level meeting the 
Chinese admonish their Japanese counterparts never to forget Japan’s wartime record.  Although 
some Chinese believe that Japan has apologized enough (Rose 2005, 108), most Chinese feel 
strongly that Japan has to come to terms with its past and “face up to history” to aid in the 
normalization of relations between the two countries.  As long as “a sizeable segment of the 
population feels little remorse and vehemently opposes any apology” (Kristof 1998: 39), 
“conservative elements in Japan…ma[ke] frequent efforts to deny the history of Japanese 
aggression” (Wu 2000: 297), numerous Japanese continue to believe that their country’s “purpose 
for invading its neighbors was…entirely noble” (freeing them from Western colonizers), and 
“cabinet ministers march to the Yasukuni Shrine” (Kristof 1998: 40), China’s resentment and 
mistrust of Japan is unlikely to diminish.  Until serious change comes about, the Chinese can be 
expected to maximize their political utility by playing the “history card.”
10  
  Does this mean that the prospects for improved Sino-Japanese relations are slim?  Not 
necessarily.  A significant number of Japanese and Chinese people appear to be ready to move on, 
confront and transcend the past, and work toward a better, more cooperative future.  Assuming 
that the time has come to tackle the vexing problem of war guilt before further “apology fatigue” 
on the part of Japan (Green 1999: 158) creates additional obstacles, what concrete steps should 
East Asia take to transcend this significant hurdle that stands in the way of greater cooperation? 
  Here, the paper argues, European history can provide useful lessons for East Asia.   
Clearly, Europeans have come a long way from the dark days of World War II.  They managed to 
deal with the past, make amends, and reestablish trust by giving rise to supranational institutions, 
thereby “forging new identities that extend beyond traditional ethnic and national boundaries” 
(Lebow 2006: 4).  As will be discussed below, over the course of several decades, the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) and, since 1990, a unified Germany, undertook a variety of steps to 
                                                           
     
10 Note that there is a large literature that argues that China uses Japan’s historical legacy to enhance its own 
domestic legitimacy.  See, for instance, Shambaugh 1996, Rose 1998, and Zhao 2000. 
 
 12confront its past, reach out to those who were harmed so gravely during the Nazi regime, and 
pledged never to commit such crimes again.  As members of the nation in whose name atrocities 
were committed most Germans understand their responsibility to guard against the possibility of 
repetition and, no longer being the actual perpetrators of these crimes, they also appear to be 
reformulating their identity (Barkan and Karn 2006: 10).   
  In the following section the paper examines three crucial elements of reconciliation: (1) 
remembrance/truth seeking; (2) restitution/justice; and (3) apology/settling the past.
11  Comparing 
various steps taken by Germany and Japan in settling their historical legacies, the paper makes 
clear why the latter thus far has been unable to successfully transcend its past. 
 
Remembrance/Truth Seeking 
 
As Rose (2005: 2) points out, there have been very different interpretations of the events 
of 1931-1945 in China and Japan (as well as within Japan) and Japanese national memory, for 
several decades, has been a significant stumbling block for improved relations with Japan’s 
neighbors.  World War II from Japan’s perspective (also known as the “Great East Asian War” or 
the “Pacific War”) was viewed as “freeing Asia from the oppressive domination of the West” 
(Jansen 2002: 626).  Since the Chinese were weak and had allowed themselves to become 
enslaved by the West, Japan, thinking of East Asia in terms of a “single house,” had the duty to 
“liberate” China (Vohra 2000: 161).  At the same time, Japan portrayed itself as the victim of 
nuclear attacks, rather than aggressor.   
During the Tokyo trials the suffering of Chinese and other Asian victims. 
(‘comfort women,’ forced laborers, victims of biological experiments) was completely ignored 
(Rose 2005: 36).  The trials not only failed to bring about justice, but led to what many scholars 
have termed Japan’s “collective amnesia” for 40 years (Rose 2005: 37).  
  To make matters worse, the content of Japanese history textbooks ever since the Ministry 
of Education obtained the authority to screen them in 1953 has been highly controversial.   
Encouraged to adopt a “patriotic tone,” and to “soften…Japan’s excesses during World War II,” 
authors speak of “self-defense,” “liberation,” and label the Nanjing massacre a “fabrication” 
(Ienaga 1996: 332).  The most recent revision of high school textbooks that caused a stir centers 
around the Imperial Army’s responsibility in the Battle of Okinawa.  Instead of acknowledging 
the Army’s role in ordering civilians to commit mass suicide in the final weeks of WW II, the 
textbooks now merely state that “mass killings and suicides took place among the residents” 
(Financial Times April 2, 2007: 6).  This “biased historiography,” time and again has led to calls 
by Chinese and other Asian victims for factual accuracy (Ienaga 1996: 348).
12
  In Germany there were the Nuremberg trials (1945-46), followed later by the Eichmann 
(1961) and Auschwitz (1963-65) trials, but Germans, for the most part, tried to come to terms 
with their past in post-war debates about the Nazi period and the Holocaust 
(Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung) which occurred in distinct stages.  As Kansteiner (2006: 108) 
explains, in the 1950s the FRG experienced a period of “communicative silence” about the 
burden of the past.  More concretely, “the consequences of war and ‘war crimes’ were 
acknowledged by the new political elites
13 in their dealings with their Allied supervisors, but not 
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13 Katzenstein (2005: 86-7) explains that the political class in Germany after 1945 was recruited from democratic 
parties during the Weimar Republic and therefore largely consisted of people who had been imprisoned or in exile 
during the Nazi dictatorship.  These people had an interest in talking about Germany’s “problematic past” and wanted 
the history books to reflect adequately what had happened during the Nazi period.  In Japan, on the other hand, the 
political class remained largely unchanged after the war, “except for the very top leadership,” and the government 
therefore favored “textbooks that expressed a strong, nationalist historiography.”    
 
 13necessarily in communications with the German population” (ibid).  In 1959 the appearance of 
anti-Semitic graffiti caused the German government to introduce educational reforms and, in the 
1960s, a group of Germans who had belonged to the Hitler Youth—but who had been too young 
to have been involved in any crimes—became more vocal and sought to bring about further 
changes in the educational system (Kansteiner 2006: 112).  
  Moreover, German historians wrote “world-renowned” histories on the Holocaust and, 
aside from unearthing the historical facts, encouraged Germany to confront its past (Bindenagel 
2006: 306).  Since Germany cannot escape its historical legacy, German politicians reminded 
German citizens time and again, they have to deal with it squarely.  In a speech on May 8, 1985, 
the 40
th anniversary of the end of World War II, German President Richard von Weizsaecker 
stressed: “All of us, whether guilty or not, whether old or young, must accept the past.  We are all 
affected by its consequences and held responsible for it” (Bindenagel 2006: 290). 
In the 1970s, the student movement assured that discussions of personal guilt would not 
be dodged.  It was important that a “clear distinction be made between those who committed 
crimes and the nation they came from” (Kaiser 2006: 92).  Since guilt is individual rather than 
collective, one needs to differentiate guilty perpetrators and their descendants.  Although the 
latter hold responsibility for the future, Kaiser (2006: 93) makes clear, they are absolved from 
responsibility for the past.  To guard against the possibility of repetition, the German government 
decreed that it is a crime to deny the Holocaust, endorses full archival openness to make sure 
information relating to Germany’s dark past will not be distorted, and continues to work hard to 
create new relationships of trust.  Projects on common history textbooks are on-going, and town 
partnerships, youth and teacher exchange programs--created decades ago to combat the revival of 
nationalism--are still going strong.  
 
Restitution/Justice 
 
  Under the Potsdam declaration, the Allied powers decided that Japan would have to hand 
over assets and capital which would then be dispersed as reparations.  Between January 1948 and 
September 1949 China received $22.5 million worth of machinery and equipment and $18.1 
million-worth of stolen goods were returned to China (Rose 2005: 42).  As Cold War tensions 
began to intensify, however, the U.S. government recommended to forgive reparations for fear of 
weakening Japan.  In a Peace Treaty with Japan in 1952 Taiwan agreed to waive reparations and, 
in 1972, the People’s Republic of China followed suit in a Joint Statement signed with Japan. 
  Although, as Rose (2005: 5) demonstrates, this left the door open for civil compensation, 
to this day, only a small number of Chinese victims have received compensation.  In general, the 
success rate appears to be better if a complaint is directed against a company, rather than a 
government, but even then a variety of criteria need to be met (claims must be in the hands of 
legislators rather than the judiciary; claims must be supported by a large group; claims must have 
merit, etc.) “for civil redress to be successful” (Brooks 1999 quoted in Rose 2005: 77-78).  Most 
cases are dismissed and, typically, judges either argue “that compensation claims were settled 
under international law, … that under the Meiji constitution the Japanese state cannot be held 
liable, or that the twenty-year statute of limitations makes the claims invalid” (ibid 96).   
  Whereas victims of Japanese atrocities have not fared very well when it comes to 
restitution, victims of the Nazi regime, comparatively, have done much better in their search for 
justice.  In 1947 U.S. occupation authorities launched the first German restitution and 
compensation programs and some of these are aiding Holocaust survivors to this day.  According 
to Bindenagel (2006: 294) the compensation programs provided by the FRG “were quite 
extensive” with the government paying “over $70 billion … directly to victims.”  Also, in the 
1990s, Germany launched a “$700 million humanitarian effort” to aid victims of Nazi atrocities 
in Eastern Europe.  Negotiations among German business leaders, politicians, and victims of Nazi 
slave labor conducted between 1999 and 2000 led to a $5 billion settlement (Bindenagel 2006: 
 14301) which was widely perceived as just.  And, just this March, KarstadtQuelle agreed to pay 
$117 million to the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany which had filed suit 
on behalf of the Wertheim family who—being Jewish--had lost its property in the late 1930s to 
the Nazis (New York Times March 31
st, 2007, B3).       
 
Apology/Settling the Past 
 
  Clearly, since the end of World War II, the Japanese government has issued numerous 
apologies for its conduct during the war, but, to this day, these apologies have not achieved the 
desired effect, i.e., improved Japan’s relations with its neighbors considerably.  Why is this the 
case? 
  As Rose (2005: 19) suggests, for an apology to be effective certain criteria must be met: 
“it must be offered with the backing and authority of the collective so that the apology is official 
and binding; it must be made publicly and on the record; and it should acknowledge the violation, 
accept responsibility, and indicate that there will be no repetition of such acts in future.”   
Moreover, reciprocity may be a must since each time an outstretched hand is not seized a further 
opportunity is lost (Kaiser 2006: 92).
14    
In any event, an apology must be “meaningful” (Kristof 1998: 38), “genuine,” “sincere,” 
and “backed by actions” (Rose 2005: 100).  Over the course of several decades, Japan repeatedly 
has expressed “regret,” “keen responsibility for the suffering it has caused,” “remorse,” “sincere 
remorse,” “genuine contrition and deepest apologies” (Rose 2005: 101), but none of the apologies 
issued to date has been accepted by the majority of Chinese people.  During a visit to Tokyo at 
the end of 1998, for instance,        
Jiang Zemin “pressed for a formal ‘apology’ (owabi) and ‘remorse’ (hansei),” but, as Green 
(1999: 158-9) explains, only got hansei.
15  Similarly, apologizing to former ‘comfort women’ in 
Korea in 1993, the Japanese government acknowledged “moral” but not “legal” responsibility 
(Rose 2005: 71).  
To make matters worse, many Japanese Prime Ministers have insisted on visiting the 
Yasukuni Shrine.  Obviously, Japanese citizens should be allowed to honor their war dead.  Ever 
since Class A (leading) war criminals were enshrined at Yasukuni in 1978, however, any visit 
there by a Japanese Prime Minister represents a “political act of state recognition of the[se] souls” 
(Takahashi 2006: 156).  The crux of the matter, as Takahashi (2006: 175) explains, is that tens of 
thousands of Taiwanese and Koreans, who had been drafted into the Japanese military during the 
Asia-Pacific War, are also enshrined at Yasukuni.  These “victims of colonial rule by Japan [were 
enshrined] in precisely the same way as Japanese people who died perpetrating the colonial 
rule…as ‘gods who defended the nation.’  For the bereaved families…who suffered colonial rule, 
this is an insult” (ibid), and they therefore undertook legal proceedings to remove their relatives 
from enshrinement, but to no avail.
16                 
There are at least two ways in which the Japanese government could defuse this 
politically charged situation.  On the one hand, it could decide to create a politically “neutral” war 
memorial that would make no reference to Japan’s war criminals (Rose 2005: 125).   
Alternatively, Japanese Prime Ministers could “leave the commemoration and mourning of the 
                                                           
   
14 For studies that argue that an apology does not require reciprocity, in fact, may be more effective unilaterally, see 
Long and Brecke 2003:26; and Suzuki 2007: 6.  
   
15 It is important to understand that there are different levels of apology in the Japanese language and that the exact 
wording chosen is crucial. 
    
16 Priest Ikeda rationalizes the refusal to remove the souls by arguing that “at the time when they died they were 
Japanese, so it is not possible for them to stop being Japanese after they died” (Takahashi 2006: 176).  As Takahashi is 
quick to point out, however, this completely ignores the fact that “the[se] people were semi-forcibly drafted into the 
war.”  
 15souls enshrined at Yasukuni up to the priests at the shrine,” even if that would mean jeopardizing 
some domestic votes (Takahashi 2006: 157).   
  An analysis of apologies made by the German government to come to terms with the 
Nazi past shows that Germany has been much more successful in moving beyond this dark 
chapter in its history.  This, as Kaiser (2006: 91) makes clear, in large part, is due to the fact that 
the Germans recognized that “the acceptance of guilt in the past must not only be open and 
public, but, in order to be truly meaningful and effective, it must generate a formal apology.”  
Case in point, former German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s reconciliation with the East.  While 
visiting the Warsaw Ghetto Monument in 1970, Brandt spontaneously fell to his knees, “[doing]”, 
as he later explained in his memoirs,  “what human beings do when speech fails them” (cited in 
Teitel 2006: 105).  This “executive apology” was then followed by the signing of the Warsaw 
Treaty.   
  As part of the 1999-2000 settlement among German business leaders, politicians, and 
victims of Nazi slave labor mentioned above, German President Johannes Rau offered a similar 
apology, “emphasizing acknowledgement and repentance rather than money” (Barkan and Karn 
2006: 23).  Rau told his audience, which included Holocaust survivors: “I know that for many it 
is not really the money that matters.  What they want is for their suffering to be recognized as 
suffering and for the injustice done to them to be named injustice.  I pay tribute to all those who 
were subjected to slave and forced labor under German rule, and, in the name of the German 
people, beg forgiveness.  We will not forget their suffering” (reprinted in Barkan and Karn 2006: 
24).
17
  So then what lessons can Japan draw from the European experience?  “In the best cases,” 
as Barkan and Karn (2006:7) stress, “the negotiation of apology works to promote dialogue, 
tolerance, and cooperation between groups knitted together uncomfortably (or ripped asunder) by 
some past injustice.  … [An] apology can create a new framework in which groups may rehearse 
their past(s) and reconsider the present.”  To the extent that apologies can “amend the past” (ibid. 
8), their psychological value is immense.  Germany seems to fit this “best case” scenario.  Having 
addressed its historical legacies and “by building a new, shared identity with former enemies,” 
Germany, in Lebow’s mind, has been able to “transcend, at least in part, [its] Germanness” (2006: 
30).  Moreover, given that an “apology becomes an act of rehabilitation for the perpetrators and 
their descendants” (Barkan and Karn 2006: 17), “atoning for the war,” as Kristof (1998: 44) 
points out, “would not only liberate Japan’s neighbors; it would also free Japan itself.”
18  Both of 
these developments, it seems, should enhance the prospects of future Sino-Japanese cooperation.   
  
Japan’s Threat Assessment 
 
North Korea, as Saunders (2004: 150) makes clear, is the most immediate threat to Japan.  
“[F]ollowing years of provocative probing of Japanese sea and air defense perimeters by North 
Korean gunboats and fighter aircraft, admitted development of nuclear weapons, kidnappings of 
Japanese citizens, relentless espionage, …the 1998 launch of a ballistic missile over Japan” 
(ibid.), and the most recent atomic test by North Korea, it is not surprising that Japan seeks 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) (Kliman 2006: 2). 
Aside from North Korea, the problem of China persists.  “[T]hroughout the post-war 
period, Japan…[has] maintained a policy of constructive engagement toward Beijing” (Green 
1999: 152), but continues to remain troubled by the uncertainty regarding China’s future 
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 16behavior. It is thus strategic instability that is believed to be the main enemy—“the lack of 
transparency in the intentions and strategic thinking of Beijing” (Lee 1997: 252)—rather than the 
fear of an imminent attack.   
Japan is well aware of the fact that “China has from time to time behaved in ways 
offensive to the rest of the world…[and] shown its willingness to use force to settle disputes, even 
when its own territory [was] not under attack” (China’s incursion into Vietnam in 1979, or its 
entering the Korean War) (Roy 1994: 156).  And, most recently, China stunned the world by 
shooting down a satellite in outer space. 
By and large, however, Japan, like many of its neighbors, is cautiously optimistic when it 
comes to China.  Unlike “a few years ago, [when] many of China’s neighbors voiced growing 
concerns about the possibility of China becoming a domineering regional hegemon and powerful 
military threat,” Shambaugh (2004/05: 64) explains, “most nations in the region now see China as 
a good neighbor…and a non-threatening regional power.”   
This is not to say that “Japan does [not] harbor concerns over improvements to China’s 
military capabilities, especially its nuclear and missile prowess” (Wu 2000: 305).  It does worry 
about developments such as China’s nuclear weapons test in 1995, or the Taiwan Strait crisis in 
1996, and therefore pursues the development of theater missile defense (TMD)--which it may 
also need to protect itself against North Korean ballistic missiles (Garrett and Glaser 1997: 393).  
Particularly vexing to Japan are the many ways in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has 
sought to shore up its military capabilities vis-à-vis Taiwan: the “deployment of approximately 
600 short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan…; the deployment of large numbers of attack 
fighters opposite Taiwan; the buildup of surface ships, submarines, and amphibious landing craft 
within range of Taiwan; periodic large-scale military exercises around Taiwan; and the refusal to 
forswear the possible use of force against Taiwan” (Shambaugh 2004: 86).  “If the PRC [People’s 
Republic of China] chose to blockade Taiwan or a military conflict across the Strait turned out to 
be a protracted one,” Wu (2000: 305) claims, “Japan’s lines of communication through the 
channel would be jeopardized.”  And yet it deserves to be stressed again that it is not the large 
military expenditures that make China’s neighbors uneasy but the anxiety stemming from the 
significant uncertainty concerning Chinese intentions. 
  But there are also outright pessimists.  Roy (1994: 149), for instance, argues that “a 
prosperous Chinese economy…would give China the capability to challenge Japan for 
domination of East Asia.”  “If China’s economic power continues to grow rapidly relative to 
Japan’s,” he insists (1994: 165), “serious political tensions between China and Japan are certain, 
and military conflict is likely.”  Or, put differently, power politics pretty much would dictate an 
economically stronger China to start acting like a major power—“bolder, more demanding, and 
less inclined to cooperate with the other major powers in the region” (ibid. 160).  Solomon and 
Drennan (2001: 231), paint an equally bleak picture suggesting that, “[a]s we enter the twenty-
first century, Asia’s security environment seems likely to be shaped by the distrust, if not rivalry, 
between China and Japan.”   
  To make things worse, China with an “authoritarian and unstable government…is more 
likely to use force in pursuit of its goals” (Roy 1994: 160), and “fac[ing] less resistance than 
Japan to building a superpower-sized military…may provoke a military buildup by Japan, 
plunging Asia into a new cold war” (ibid. 150).  Glaser (1993: 271), similarly, discusses the 
possibility of an increasingly powerful China causing a regional arms race due to the security 
dilemma.  It is therefore imperative, according to Solomon and Drennan (2001: 232), to keep the 
US involved in East Asian politics.  “Without the forward US military presence (i.e., the 
stationing of US military personnel in South Korea and Japan), these scholars suggest, “a 
resurgent rivalry between China and Japan” may not be avoidable and could easily lead to 
Japan’s remilitarization. 
  At the same time it is understood that a fragile China, one that might experience 
significant domestic conflict and even disintegrate, also is not in East Asia’s best interest.  On the 
 17contrary, an impoverished and unstable China would also be worrisome, since in this scenario 
Japan would have to deal with millions of refugees (Wu 2000: 307). 
 
Institution-Building in East Asia 
 
  Given the history of the region, East Asians are sensitive to infringements on their 
sovereignty and reluctant to curtail their freedom of action.  When they do agree to cooperate in 
the context of international organizations, they insist on consensus decision- making--as in 
ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which will be discussed in more detail below--
to protect their sovereignty (Simon 2001: 3).  
  To the extent possible, East Asian countries, much like others, and as predicted by 
neorealists, seek to engage in self-help.  Since cooperation leaves a country vulnerable to 
opportunistic behavior on the part of its allies, the country can be expected to do everything in its 
power to enhance its security before relying on others.  Japan, for instance, although its autonomy 
for a number of years was significantly constrained by systemic forces as a result of World War 
II, gradually improved its capabilities by modifying Article 9 and allowing its Self-Defense 
Forces to evolve.  According to Kliman (2006: 67) this trend is likely to continue “as normative 
constraints on Japan’s defense policy weaken.” 
  Yet, “[i]n light of Japan’s traditional problems with China, Korea and Russia, … possible 
repercussions for the security of sea lanes as a result of China’s territorial claims in the South 
China Sea and the East China Sea” (Lee 1997: 257), and continuing military constraints (no 
nuclear weapons; military export restrictions), self-help is clearly insufficient to assure Japan’s 
security.  Instead it is essential for Japan to retain close ties with the US, to share the defense 
burden and thereby enhance the chances of US troops remaining stationed in the country, and 
prolong the security alliance with the US indefinitely.  As Cha (2003: 108) demonstrates, ever 
since the end of World War II it was bilateralism that helped promote peace in the region.   
Specifically, the American “hub and spokes network of bilateral alliances” (ibid.) deserves credit 
for bringing stability to East Asia.
19    
  Presently, the “hub and spokes model” consisting of five bilateral alliances between the 
US and Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand predominates.  But is it wise 
to put all of one’s eggs in one basket, that is, solely rely on bilateralism?  Cha (2003: 111) seems 
to think so, arguing that multilateral arrangements offer little security beyond what the existing 
alliances already provide, would only restrict maneuverability and thus add little value.  Betts 
(1993/94), on the other hand, considers too heavy a reliance on the US dangerous.  Even though 
“[t]he United States remains formally committed to a strategic role in the Pacific,” he explains 
(1993/94: 51),  “its military presence has…been attenuated as the flag has come down from 
Philippine bases, land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons have been removed, and defense 
budgets cuts trim the number of forces regularly on station elsewhere in the neighborhood.”  
  Shambaugh (2004/05:95), much like Cha, acknowledges the importance of bilateralism 
and the crucial role of the US in shoring up East Asian security, yet advocates for Japan to 
develop broader security ties and predicts the emergence of a “multitextured and multilayered 
regional system.”  As has become apparent in the European case, there are numerous forms of 
institutions with varying memberships, levels of commitment, etc., to choose from.  Thus, in the 
following, several institutional arrangements that have been discussed in the European context, 
and/or have been put in place there, will be considered for East Asia alongside already existing 
security structures. 
  If one continues the above discussion of security arrangements and, gradually, increases 
the number of countries involved, trilateralism logically follows bilateralism.  And there are a few 
                                                           
    
19 This fact, obviously, has not gone unnoticed and explains, at least in part, why former Japanese Prime Minister 
Koizumi agreed to aid the US in Iraq (see Kliman 2006: 139). 
 18scholars who have given trilateral security structures some thought.  Lee (1997), for example, 
leaves no doubt that it is imperative to engage China.  “As the future of Asia-Pacific security will 
to a large extent be determined by China, the United States and Japan,” he argues, “a stable 
triangular relationship involving Sino-Japanese relations, Sino-American relations and US-Japan 
relations would be of paramount importance for the maintenance of stability and prosperity of the 
region” (ibid. 258).  The key here, obviously, is a stable triangle and it is not clear whether the 
US, Japan and China can cooperate giving equal consideration to each partner.  Funabashi (1993: 
83) is skeptical, reminding us that “[t]riangular relationships, by their nature, reduce international 
relations to a zero-sum game: any of the three powers is apt to suspect the other two of colluding 
to augment their bargaining power.  A triangle made up of China, with its despotic government 
and closed economy, Japan, with its ambiguous policy decision-making process, and the United 
States, with its tradition of playing China and Japan against each other,” he concludes, “could be 
a dangerous one.” 
  Given the risks associated with trilateralism, it may make sense to add additional 
members to the security structure to reduce the likelihood of two countries ganging up against 
one.  Minilateral arrangements consisting of a small number of participants (3-4)
20 may be 
considered.  By virtue of their relatively small size it may be possible to give rise to such 
arrangements fairly quickly, deal with real security issues (like the cooperation on North Korean 
nuclear proliferation by the US, Japan, and South Korea), keep the arrangements focused and, 
once they have served their purpose, disband them (Cha 2003: 116-7).   
Minilaterals whose members are great powers are referred to as concerts.  In this form of 
collective security a small group of major powers cooperates to resist aggression, monitors 
events, and reaches decisions via consensus.
21  The most well-known concert is the Concert of 
Europe where Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia managed to uphold the status quo on the 
European continent from the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815) until the Crimean War (1854-
56).  Based on the stability the cooperation of the great four European powers brought,
22 Betts 
(1993/94: 75) suggests that, “if a concert of great powers in East Asia is feasible, we should seek 
it.”  At the same time, however, he seems to doubt the effectiveness of such a security provision 
for East Asia advising that “no one should depend on [a concert] to solve more than modest 
disputes” (ibid. 71). 
  Adding additional members to minilateral security structures leads to multilateral 
arrangements
23 and, when one thinks of these in the context of Asia, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) comes to mind.  Founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to “demonstrate solidarity against communist expansion in 
Vietnam and insurgency within their own borders,”
24 today ASEAN consist of 10 members 
(Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia were added over time) and mainly seeks to 
promote economic and cultural cooperation.  As Acharya (2003: 206) makes clear, however, 
ASEAN also has developed a number of security goals: it seeks to deny any power to dominate 
the region; works toward the peaceful management of regional territorial disputes; seeks to 
prevent an arms race and to keep the US strategically engaged in the region.  Moreover, it tries to 
engage China rather than to contain it (ibid. 219).  To accomplish its goals ASEAN prefers 
informal over structured talks, searches for consensus--though not necessarily unanimity--and 
                                                           
    
20 In situations where there is a great likelihood of two countries ganging up against the third, obviously, a 
minilateral arrangement consisting of three participants would defeat its purpose, that is, to enhance the security of all 
participants. 
    
21 For a more detailed discussion of concerts, see Kupchan 1994. 
    
22 France was successfully brought back into the European security arrangement at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle 
in 1818. 
    
23 The cut-off point between these two institutional arrangements seems somewhat arbitrary. 
    
24 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASEAN 
 19“attempt[s] to reconcile national strategies with multilateral norms and principles” (Acharya 
2003: 254-268).   
  Aside from ASEAN other multilateral structures exist in the region to promote stability.  
The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) founded in 1993, for example, brings 
together diplomats and members of the Defense Departments of China, the US, Russia, Japan, 
and South Korea to engage in “track-two” security dialogues.  Similarly, the Council on Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) founded in 1994 promotes track-two discussions.   
Unlike NEACD, however, CSCAP is a non-governmental organization that was created by 
research institutes in the region and its participants are individuals (Jin 2002: 192-3). 
  The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), also launched in 1994, is an informal multilateral 
dialogue mechanism of 26 members
25 who seek to address security issues in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  Drawing upon the chief normative framework for inter-state behavior developed by 
ASEAN, namely the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation,” Acharya (2003: 185-9) explains, the 
chief purpose of ARF is to build “security with others rather than against them.”  Hence, whereas 
confidence building, preventive diplomacy, non-discrimination and transparency are encouraged, 
the organization discourages the use of force by members to settle disputes, but “does not make 
any provision for common action to punish an act of aggression” (Acharya 2003: 190).  Some of 
the measures proposed by ARF include a regional arms register, the exchange of defense white 
papers, observers during military exercises, etc. (ibid. 190).  And, with respect to the rivalry 
between the two big East Asian countries, Buzan and Weaver (2003: 158) argue, ARF “binds 
both Japan and China into a regional institutional framework, allowing Japan to address its 
historical problem, China to address fears of its neighbors, and both to avoid conspicuous 
balancing behavior towards each other.”  
  To sum up, a variety of cooperative security arrangements presently exist in East Asia 
and the hub and spokes model discussed above, clearly, is of utmost importance.  Yet there is 
recognition that sole reliance on a bilateral relationship with the US is insufficient (even 
dangerous), and that arrangements on multiple levels of governance and with varying degrees of 
commitment are desirable.  As Huang (2002: 260), borrowing from Vinod Aggarwal suggests, 
“bilateral security arrangements should be nested into transregional security regimes such as ARF 
and CSCAP, so that the norms, rules and practices of transregional security regimes can 
transplant to bilateral security arrangements.”  Similarly, Katzenstein (2004:103), focusing on 
Japan, explains that the country favors bilateralism, yet, seeks to complement it with “embryonic 
multilateralism” (track-two dialogues) to create trust.  Vaeyrynen (2001: 166) could not agree 
more.  In his mind, Japan also seeks a multifaceted approach to security, namely “to deepen 
regional economic integration, enhance subregional security integration and mutual reassurance, 
and rely on firm and predictable US-Japanese cooperation.”  
  What is also clear is that East Asians prefer a “gradual, incremental approach to 
cooperation over legalistic and fast-track modalities of institution-building” (Acharya 2003: 15).  
In other words, it is preferable to begin by building mutual trust, respect, and tolerance through 
regular talks and then graduate to more ambitious goals.  “[C]onfidence-building measures, 
preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution,” according to Lee (1997: 262), are the bottom line, 
and multilateral institutions, by “redefin[ing] identities and acceptable standards of behavior” 
(Katzenstein 2004: 120), and promoting greater transparency, are a good way of getting there.    
  And yet, ARF and CSCAP are “talk shops,” …they do not negotiate treaties or impose 
formal obligations” (Simon 2001: 4).  In fact, ARF, as Katzenstein (2004: 115) explains, “has 
sidestepped the most pressing security issues in Asia: conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, across 
the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea.”    
                                                           
    
25 The current members of ARF consist of ASEAN plus Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, the People’s Republic of 
China, the European Union, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Russia, East Timor, and the United States. 
 20Does this make them paper tigers? Hardly.  These institutions fulfill an important role: the 
creation of trust and reciprocity (Simon 2001: 4).  By virtue of “[c]onsensus decision making 
[they] also permit some states to abstain from an agreement without obstructing the will of the 
majority,” and thereby allow for greater flexible than unanimity rule (ibid).  These institutions are 
vital when it comes to community building and their members hope that by engaging each other 
they can promote understanding, avoid problems from spiraling out of control, and over time 
create more sophisticated security structures that can cope with bigger problems.  The idea is to 
acquire information and then, gradually, change interests and preferences.  Or, as Johnston and 
Evans (1999: 264) put it, “the most important function of dialogue fora is not the rules they create 
but the suspicions they allay and the norms they reinforce.”  In the case of ARF and CSCAP this 
translates into the non-use of force for settling disputes.   
Much like in Europe, it is hoped that integration in one area (for instance the economic 
realm) will spill over into others and facilitate cooperation there (Betts 1993/94: 72).  But as 
European developments also have shown, this does not happen over night, nor should one expect 
smooth sailing all the way.  As the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC), for 
instance, makes clear, it is likely that there will be occasional setbacks.  In fact, the present “rise 
in political tensions and nationalism” in East Asia may constitute just that (Kaiser 2006: 96).     
  Strategic instability does exist in East Asia and the countries in the region seem to 
understand that it is in their interest to include their most likely adversaries in cooperative 
security arrangements, rather than to ally against them.  Along those lines it, for instance, makes 
sense to include Japanese troops in multilateral peacekeeping, especially “if the alternative were 
Japanese remilitarization outside such a framework” (Betts 1993/94:57).
26  It may also be 
beneficial to create confidence-building measures in the region that resemble the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of the 1970s (Kaiser 2006: 97).  To mention but one 
further possibility, a multilateral arrangement resembling the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) may be of great help in stabilizing the region by making it virtually 
impossible for the members to go to war with each other.    
  What specific form cooperative security arrangements in the region will take in the not 
too distant future is still to be determined.  What is clear is that these institutions will be “a 
compliment to, rather than substitute for, existing bilateral arrangements” (Acharya 2003: 195).  
In the words of Acharya (2003: 325) the ”best prospects for the regulation of Great Power 
competition in Asia are through cross-cutting bilateral channels, with occasional resort to ad hoc 
multilateral consultations.”  He even goes further and suggests that, depending on the issues, a 
“division of labor” between ARF and something resembling a “concert” of the Great Powers may 
be desirable (ibid. 326).  
Japan these days seeks to “hedge against possible Chinese hegemony” and tries to 
integrate China into the region (Green 1999: 165).  China, likewise, seeks to take steps to prevent 
Japan’s remilitarization.  It is clear to all parties involved in East Asian security matters that 
institutions are not a “cure-all” but, due to the benefits outlined above, a step in the right 
direction.  The goal is to encourage positive behavior when feasible, but have cooperative 
structures to rely on when benevolence fails to accomplish the desired outcome. 
 In the end, those who caution that East Asia is NOT Europe are correct.  Whereas the 
Europeans already curtailed their freedom of action significantly in the early post-1945 period, 
introduced multilateral structures, and progressed fairly rapidly toward greater integration, the 
East Asians for a number of years relied on bilateral security arrangements with the US and only 
fairly recently began to experiment with multilateral security structures.  Despite this delayed 
start and more incremental approach to trust building, this paper has shown, there are important 
lessons East Asia can learn from Europe when it comes to the process of security integration.  
                                                           
     
26 Obviously, the case of German rearmament within a European Army to exercise control over the German military 
is important here. 
 21First, the European case makes clear that historical legacies not only need to be addressed, but 
dealt with in a particular manner, to remove the big stumbling block these issues still represent 
for East Asia.  Specifically, studies of European reconciliation identify elements (remembrance, 
restitution, apology) essential in coming to terms with the past and thereby provide East Asia with 
a blueprint that it can follow and, where needed, modify to account for differences in timing, 
cultural heterogeneity, etc.  Second, to achieve the remarkable stability the Europeans have 
enjoyed since the end of World War II it appears to be beneficial, if not imperative, to coordinate 
security provisions on multiple levels and, over time, give rise to a complex web of governance 
that can allay suspicions, reinforce rules, and promote trust.  Third, European integration also 
demonstrates that spillover from one area of cooperation to another is likely, but, that it is also 
likely that there will be setbacks on the road to greater institutionalization.  
  As the above discussion has shown, East Asians are no longer solely relying on their 
bilateral security relations with the US, but also imbedding their security provisions in regional 
institutional structures.  ARF is no NATO or OSCE, but it does represent a step in the right 
direction.  Similarly, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent conciliatory moves toward 
China are encouraging.  It is about time both Japan and China take concrete steps to deal with 
their historical legacies, remove remaining obstacles to cooperation, and move beyond talking.  If 
Europe is any indication, Action Plans will have to be next.  
  Finally, conceptually speaking, if there are any lessons to be learned it is that regional 
stability assessments, by themselves, do not suffice to shed light on East Asian security 
provisions.  To understand why East Asian countries have given rise to the specific security 
structures in existence today it is essential to “cross-fertilize” governance approaches with 
ideational and psychological conceptual frameworks.  Reason clearly mattered in these decisions, 
but an accurate understanding of why the actors behaved the way they did cannot be obtained 
without examining their ideas and emotions. 
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